The fact is: There is *no* copy operation in the filter driver level.
Period. Let’s make a test - I will send you a FileSpy output and you
will try to get the idea what’s happening at user level (i.e.
if it is a “Save As”, “Save”, “copy file”, “Move File” or whatever).
I bet my two salaries that you will fail to identify the cases even with
human inteligence and excellent human’s pattern recognition ability,
how do you propose you will learn a software to do this ?
My personal advice is “give it up”.
Sorry to being too, ahem, negative, but approach you wanna do
will *never* work. Even if you will be able to make it run for e.g. MS Word,
it will completely fail for another app or Word version.
L.
----- Original Message -----
From: Shreshth Luthra
To: Windows File Systems Devs Interest List
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 12:03 PM
Subject: Re: [ntfsd] Copy Operation Detection
Hi All,
Getting into the same stuff again 
I do agree with all of you that there cannot be a case that i will get all the Copy operations captured in my filter driver. But my aim is something different.
I do not bother about completeness at this stage but i do want to identify the copy operations (by means of applying some heuristics on READ and WRITE operations) in as much case as possilbe.
It is OK if i do not get COPY log in certain cases and even if sometimes i am wrong in identifying the Copy operation.
In order to do so, i am not very clear about the approach i should take to start with.
Taking the case of a WORD file, logically, it should monitor for READs where the data length is not zero, get the address of the buffer and then look for the WRITE on the some other file using the same process, with the same address of buffer and same offset.
But i do not know if such kind of thing is actually feasible.
If someone has worked on such kind of Heuristic approach, he case guide me better.
Again, i would like to clarify, i do not bother much about leaks (whether intentional or unintentional). But something should be captured.
Thanks in advance.
Regards,
Shreshth Luthra
On 4/10/06, Maxim S. Shatskih wrote:
>performed i.e. to find the IRP which tells that it is the Copy Operation.
No such IRP. Copy cannot be distinguished from any other write.
>I have seen a few products in market which are able to detect it at driver
>level.
They cheat.
More so - such products have no value. They cannot prevent the sensitive
information leak - the user can, say, download BZIP2 (not known to this
product) and compress the file using it, then leak the compressed file.
Maxim Shatskih, Windows DDK MVP
StorageCraft Corporation
xxxxx@storagecraft.com
http://www.storagecraft.com
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